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A Land Divided: Sakhalin and the Amur Expedition of G.I. Nevel’skoi, 1848-1855
By Sharyl Corrado
Abstract
In histories and geographies of Russia, Sakhalin Island, off the east coast of Siberia, is often
treated as separate from the mainland, an isolated island sharing little with its neighbor across the
strait. Yet this has not always been the case. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Amur River and
its delta were viewed as a unit centered on waterways, and included the mainland to the north of
the river and Sakhalin across the delta to its east. To Russians, it was an unknown wilderness,
unmapped, uninhabited, and of little interest to the state. Yet this was changing, as an increase in
Pacific shipping rendered the region economically and geo-politically strategic. This article
examines the negotiation of Russia's eastern border, a conflict not between nations, but between
liberal Russians, who sought to locate ‘natural,’ scientific borders, and the Tsar's conservative
statesmen, intent on preserving the status quo. To the state, the land was Chinese based on a
seventeenth-century treaty, although the exact border was unknown and unimportant. Naval
officer Gennadii Nevel'skoi disagreed, arguing that the land was naturally Russian, and vital to
Russia's interests. After four years of exploration, Nevel'skoi and his supporters finally
convinced the Tsar of the region's Russianness and importance, and the Tsar ordered in troops
and a Russian administration. In the process, however, the region was divided, the mainland
becoming Russian both administratively and in the Russian imagination, while Sakhalin became
the ‘other,’ imagined as separate from Russia and governed as such.
Keywords
Sakhalin; Amur; Russian empire; Russian Far East; Borders
As Admiral Gennadii Nevel’skoi told the story more than two decades later, he had been
a hero—a valiant explorer who relinquished the comforts of civilization and risked his career to
rescue savages from oppression and restore lost lands to their rightful ruler. On 12 July 1850,
two years after his departure from St. Petersburg, the young Lieutenant Commander Nevel’skoi
and a crew of eight were exploring the barren Amur River delta in eastern Siberia by rowboat.
One hundred kilometers upstream, they happened upon a crowd of Nivkhs and Ul’chas gathered
around a Manchu chieftain, who sat importantly on a stump. 1 When he saw the unexpected
visitors, the Manchu elder questioned their presence in those parts, but Nevel’skoi insisted they
had a ‘complete and exclusive right to be here’ and that not the Russians, but the Manchus must
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immediately depart. The chieftain summoned his men to attack, but soon acquiesced when
Nevel’skoi pulled a pistol from his pocket. The indigenous onlookers, Nevel’skoi reported, burst
into laughter, while the elder grew pale, jumped from his stump, swore that he desired only
friendship, and invited Nevel’skoi to dinner. 2
While it seems to belong more to an adventure film than to the annals of diplomatic
history, 3 in Nevel’skoi’s account, it was this comical and seemingly chance encounter that
prompted his declaration of the territory to be Russian, an unauthorized assertion contentious at
the time and a source of tension for years to come. The interactions that followed allegedly
convinced Nevel’skoi of not only his right, but his duty to assert Russia’s claim to the Amur
Liman—the narrow, muddy lagoon near the mouth of the river—along with Sakhalin to its east
and the mainland Amur basin to its west. While authorities in St. Petersburg considered the
territory Chinese, Nevel’skoi allegedly learned at this meeting that the Qing had no military
posts on the lower Amur River, 4 and that local peoples paid no tribute to the emperor. He
reported that the Nivkhs distrusted the Manchus, who were breaking Qing law by trading in
foreign lands. He also learned—so we are told—that foreign ships pillaged their villages each
spring, likely from among the numerous American whaling vessels in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Nevel’skoi explained in his memoir that for all of these reasons, he proclaimed to aboriginals and
Manchus alike that while Russians had not set foot there in many years, they had always
considered the region their own. Henceforth, both the land and people would be protected by the
tsar. He allegedly confirmed his pronouncement with a written declaration: ‘In the name of the
Russian state, I hereby declare to all foreign ships sailing in the Gulf of Tatary that… the shores
of the Gulf and the Pri-amur region … along with Sakhalin Island are Russian domains
[rossiiskiia vladeniia].’ 5
While the details are likely apocryphal, Nevel’skoi’s declaration and the responses it
evoked illuminate conflicting views within Russia of its border in the east. Narratives of Russian
history tend to treat Russia’s eastward expansion as either conquest—an aggressive Russian state
conquering foreign lands—or as a natural process of expansion that took place over centuries. In
the 1840s, as growing nationalism plagued the empires of Europe, Russians faced a crisis of
identity. Russia was simultaneously a nation and an empire, russkii and rossiiskii, with no clear
distinction between the two. While the term rossiiskii refers generally to the empire, and russkii
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to the nation, at the time, the terms were often used interchangeably, failing to distinguish
between its empire and Russia itself. Indeed, such a distinction was difficult to make. Russia had
been founded through expansion and the assimilation of indigenous peoples, a fact emphasized
fifty years later with historian Vasilii Kliuchevskii’s famous assertion that ‘the history of Russia
is the history of a country colonizing itself.’ 6
In the context of European nationalism, defining Russia became a matter of particular
significance. Avoiding the question of Russia’s physical geography, Tsar Nicholas I defined
Russia by the triad of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Narodnost’—the last an ambiguous term
referring to purportedly recognizable characteristics of Russians themselves. This was
insufficient, however, to the European-educated liberals of the 1840s, who were afraid for their
motherland and pushed for reform. Influenced by romantic nationalism in Europe and its
resulting quests for national histories and homelands, these young nationalists strove to discover
their fatherland’s heritage and natural borders. 7 The resulting tension was felt more than 6000
km from St. Petersburg, as Nevel’skoi’s exploration incited re-mapping of Russia itself.
While the mid-nineteenth century was an age of nationalism, it was likewise an era of
imperialism, albeit no longer the annexation of nearby land and peoples characteristic of the
Ottomans, Austrians, and Russians themselves. As the industrial revolution eased travel across
oceans and around the world, European powers competed for colonies in Asia, Africa, and the
Americas. Having a colonial empire implied power and prestige, and those who failed to defend
their land risked losing it to the colonialism of others. To compete, Russia had to not only
establish its borders as a nation, but to join the race for colonial acquisitions. In the Caucasus,
Russia confronted Persia, Britain, and France, while it competed with Persia and later Britain for
Turkestan. While contiguous, both Turkestan and the Caucasus were unapologetically colonies,
considered non-Russian land with non-Russian peoples whom Russia sought to ‘civilize’ and
exploit for their resources. Alaska—or Russian America—was the nation’s only overseas colony,
albeit of waning value with the decline of the fur trade. 8 Sakhalin was soon to become its second.
A number of questions plagued Russians concerning their country’s boundary in the East.
Where was Russia’s ‘real’ border, and how was it determined? According to folklore, Russia was
unbounded and unmeasurable. For a land inhabited by subjects of neither, what did it mean to be
labeled Russian or Chinese? If the Amur Basin did belong to Russia—as Nevel’skoi and others
3

claimed—was it part of Russia itself, which had expanded naturally over the centuries? Or was it
a colony, a land strategic and prestigious to Russia, but separate from the Russian homeland? In
the context of both nationalism and imperialism, these questions could no longer be ignored.
THE AMUR BASIN
The Amur River basin [figure 1] had long maintained an ambiguous relationship with
Russia. Explorers and traders reached the lower Amur in the 1640s, and for the next four
decades, Russian Cossacks collected tribute from the indigenous peoples of the region.
Nineteenth-century Russians were familiar with the territory through the life of Protopope
Avvakum, exiled there in 1653. Yet when the powerful Qing dynasty turned its attention to the
north, Russia agreed to the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), which declared the border ambiguously
‘from the top of the cliffs or rocky mountains in which is the source … of the Gorbitsa River and
along the peaks of those mountains to the sea.’ 9 By the mid-nineteenth century, no one knew
which river was once the Gorbitsa or which mountains constituted its source. For the next 150
years—as a Russian exile recalled in his memoirs—‘the two neighbouring empires did not know
accurately what distance separated them, and what was in the interior.’ 10
Events of the 1840s granted the region new significance not only to Russia, but to the
world. In 1842, Britain defeated China in the first Opium War, leading to the opening of ports
and new shipping in the region. To its north, the Sea of Okhotsk was a hotbed of the whaling
industry, while to the south, the United States hoped to open Japan to trade. Russian statesmen
knew that if the Amur proved navigable, a natural highway would not only connect Siberian
resources with emerging markets, but it would grant enemies access to Russia’s interior.
Nicholas I seemed eager to acquire what he labeled the ‘Russian [russkaia] river Amur,’ 11 but
hesitated out of fear of antagonizing the Chinese. Two covert expeditions were dispatched to
explore the region, but no channel was located. The Tsar authorized no further exploration.
The writings of Nevel’skoi and his associates shed light on the process through which the
mainland Amur region—once considered distant, insignificant, and foreign—became
‘inalienable property of Russia,’ 12 while Sakhalin—once an integral component of the Amur
River Basin—became separated from the mainland, no longer part of the Amur region, and no
longer Russia at all. While the written word does not accurately represent physical reality, and
perceptions reflect preconceptions of the viewer, these reports and diaries served as a lens
4

through which the region became known to the Russian state. When the Tsar proclaimed the
mainland Amur basin Russian in 1853, the Amur he claimed was that of Nevel’skoi and his
associates. The Sakhalin Russia invaded was that of Boshniak and Voronin, sent by Nevel’skoi
to report on the region. Through these documents decisions were made that define Russia even
today.
DEFINING RUSSIA
To Russian liberals seeking reform, a key aspect of defining Russia was locating its
natural, historical boundaries, those defined by geography rather than diplomacy, by ethnography
rather than conquest. In Berlin, geographer Carl Ritter was teaching that true states were organic,
with borders determined by physical geography and historical patterns of settlement. According
to him it was biologically necessary for nations to expand along naturally-determined routes. 13
Influenced by Ritter—an honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences—as well
as other European scholars, Western-leaning Russians founded the Russian Geographical Society
in 1845 to ‘facilitate knowledge of the Russian [russkaia] land and the Russian people [russkii
narod],’ as secretary Petr Semenov later explained. 14 Meanwhile, at Moscow University,
historian Sergei Solov’ev contributed to the cause by teaching that true Russian territory was
united geographically by its extensive river system, which had enabled expansion throughout the
centuries. 15 Although Solov’ev analyzed pre-modern Russian settlement across European Russia,
there was nothing to prevent his theory from applying farther east in the modern era. 16
Specifying Russia’s exact eastern border was impossible, as the land remained unmapped, and
hence, unknown.
Even labeling the territory was problematic. Much has been written on the gradual,
ambiguous, and even today incomplete process through which Siberia became Russian [russkii,
part of the Russian nation] in the mid to late nineteenth century. 17 Until 1884, East Siberia was
governed by a governor general [general-gubernator], a colonial official familiar primarily from
the British colonies. The Amur territory was east of East Siberia, even further removed from
Russia’s European heartland. Moreover, the designation ‘Amur’ had no clear referent. The term
‘Amur region’ [amurskii krai, priamur’e, amurskaia oblast’] most often denoted not the
geographical zone of the Amur River basin, but the river itself and the land to its immediate
north. 18 Sakhalin was also part of the Amur region in the 1840s. In an 1849 memo written before
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Nevel’skoi’s arrival in the east, a special committee in St. Petersburg defined the ‘Amur
territory’ [mestnost’ Amura] as ‘the mainland shore on the left [north] side of the river and the
northern shore of Sakhalin Island.’ 19 (emphasis mine) The changing definition of the Priamur’e,
and in particular, the changing position of Sakhalin in regard to the Amur, provide insight into
the establishment of the border and the defining of Russia itself.
The ambiguity of borders
Scholars today recognize the ambiguity and instability of borders, emphasizing the difference
between the physical geography of a region—including the borders experienced on the ground—
and a person’s mental map, representing the perceptions and knowledge that a person has of an
area, often through maps and descriptions of the region. In his memoir, Nevel’skoi made a
similar distinction between borders that existed myslenno—as an idea— shown on maps through
which the region was known to outsiders, and those which existed fakticheski, or in fact, visibly
dividing the territory. 20 Yet myslennye—imagined—borders were created by more than maps
alone. In this essay, I trace the process through which mainland territory shown on maps as
Chinese was re-imagined as ‘inalienable property of Russia,’ inseparable from the historic
Russian heartland, while Sakhalin became detached from the Amur basin. 21 When Nevel’skoi
arrived in 1848, neither side of the Liman was fakticheski Russian, although he claimed both in
the name of the Tsar. In less than a decade, an island previously unknown, considered by
explorers to be a natural extension of the Amur basin, became imagined as ‘other’—not part of
the Amur, and not even Russian at all. In an era of both nation-building and imperial expansion,
the mainland Amur basin became part of the nation, while Sakhalin became part of its empire.
Surprisingly little has been written about Russia’s acquisition of the Amur region. In the
Soviet narrative of Russian expansion, Russia’s right to both Sakhalin and the mainland Amur
basin is taken for granted, the position held by Nevel’skoi in the 1840s but disputed at the time
by the Russian state. Soviet scholars emphasized the settlement of ‘empty’ wilderness and the
protection of its exploited peoples, often portraying Nevel’skoi as a heroic patriot. 22 In Englishlanguage scholarship, the hero is often Nikolai Murav’ev, the East Siberian governor who
spearheaded Russia’s acquisition of the territory and negotiated the Treaty of Aigun in 1858,
adding 600,000 square kilometers to the empire, an act referred to alternately as ‘annexation’ or
‘conquest.’ 23 Recent emphasis on Russia’s position as a multi-national empire has led to a focus
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on the Russification of the Amur people, rather than the land, and to acknowledgment that its
longtime inhabitants were neither Russian nor Chinese. 24 Mark Bassin’s masterful Imperial
Visions powerfully demonstrates the discursive significance of the region in the quest for a
Russian national identity, 25 yet even he treats the Amur region as ending naturally at the Liman.
Even historiographically, Sakhalin has been separated from the Russian mainland.
Through exploration and diplomacy, both Siberia and the mainland Amur region became
russkii—part of the Russian nation—in the mid-nineteenth century, a status seldom questioned
since then, despite the chaos of wars, decolonization, and the rise and fall of the USSR. Sakhalin,
however, did not. Although the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg granted Sakhalin to Russia, in
Russian minds Sakhalin became a colony, a non-Russian territory governed by Russia, a status it
holds for many Russians even today. To Anton Chekhov, who visited the island in 1890,
Sakhalin served as an ‘other’ against which Russianness itself was redefined. 26 While some
Russians adopted Nevel’skoi’s view of the island as rightfully belonging to Russia, others noted
that the Japanese had been there decades, possibly centuries, before any Russians arrived. 27
Soviet historians, in contrast, cited a presumed seventeenth-century discovery of Sakhalin to
support Russia’s right to the entire island. 28 Outside of Russia, John J. Stephan, author of the
authoritative English-language history of Sakhalin, depicts the island as historically Chinese,
while Japanese historian Akizuki Toshiyuki emphasizes that the land belonged to its indigenous
inhabitants, themselves subjects of the Qing. 29 Yet the question of to whom Sakhalin truly
belongs predates the attention granted Sakhalin in print.
THE AMUR LIMAN
When Gennadii Nevel’skoi departed for the Far East in 1848, fundamental differences
existed between his own mental map of the region and that of the Tsar’s ministers in St.
Petersburg. The official state map of Asian Russia [Aziatskaia Rossiia]—through which the
statesmen know the region—placed the Sino-Russian border well to the north of the Amur. 30
[See figure 2] Yet this was the myslennaia border described by Nevel’skoi, one which appeared
on maps but corresponded little to patterns of settlement or state control. Moreover, as imagined
by the ministers, the Amur River was unnavigable, a ‘fact’ demonstrated as recently as 1846,
rendering it of little value to the state. No one knew for certain whether Sakhalin was an island.
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Many older maps depicted it as such, but recent explorers such as Ivan Kruzenshtern, who
explored the region in 1805, had failed to find a strait between Sakhalin and the mainland. [See
figure 3] The most detailed maps, therefore, depicted Sakhalin as a peninsula.
A top graduate of the Naval Cadet Corps familiar with recent developments in
geography, Nevels’koi shared the quest of the Russian Geographical Society for a Russian
national identity. 31 Nevel’skoi was almost certainly familiar with the works of Carl Ritter, which
describe in detail the seventeenth-century Russian discovery and exploration of the Amur
basin. 32 He also associated closely with his Naval College acquaintance Aleksandr Balasoglo, a
member of the Russian Geographical Society and archivist at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
According to Balasoglo, who was influenced by Ritter and had studied the history of the region
in the archives, East Siberia was part of a larger Russia that stretched to the Pacific, the ‘natural
purpose’ [estestvennoe naznachenie] of which was to serve Russia as a whole. 33 Together
Nevel’skoi and Balasoglo planned a joint expedition to the Amur delta, the latter to travel
through Siberia and down the river itself, while Nevel’skoi would approach by sea. Balasoglo
was forced to abandon his plans, while Nevel’skoi accepted an assignment to deliver supplies to
Kamchatka in 1848, intent on exploring the Amur delta further southward as well.
Abstract belief in a Russian national homeland was not the sole motivation for
Nevel’skoi’s exploration. As a skilled navigator who knew the charts and notes of past explorers,
Nevel’skoi distrusted their conclusions. He believed that the Amur River was navigable, writing
before his departure, ‘is it possible that such a vast river as the Amur would fail to carve an outlet
into the sea and instead get lost in the sand?’ 34 If this were true, whether or not the land was
naturally Russian, it was strategic to Russia. In an age of imperialism, it was crucial that Russia
establish its presence there before its rivals did, both to profit from Pacific trade and to protect
Siberian resources. Balasoglo shared this view, warning the newly-appointed Governor General
of East Siberia, Nikolai Murav’ev, ‘If Russia does not wish to recognize its treasures, someone
else will. A holy place will not remain empty!’ 35 Murav’ev would soon become Nevel’skoi’s
biggest supporter, his name associated forever with Russia’s acquisition of the Amur. 36
While they disagreed about the region’s geography and significance, neither Nevel’skoi
nor the Tsar’s ministers distinguished between Sakhalin—the east bank of the Amur Liman—
and the river’s western shore. To the statesmen, what mattered was the river, with its liman and
straits providing access from the Pacific. To Nevels’koi and his men, the densely-forested land
8

only hindered exploration. The natural unit was the water itself, along with its shores, upon
which settlements could be established. Six years later, Nevel’skoi would continue to insist—
despite opposition—that ‘the Pri-Amur and Pri-Ussurii lands are an indivisible whole, where the
rivers and sea provide the only means of transportation.’ 37 To Nevel’skoi it seemed obvious that
they should be governed as a unit. The question in 1849, however, was not the region’s
interconnectedness, but whether it was Russia’s to govern.
The rogue explorer
While Nevel’skoi was a nationalist, he was also an imperialist—a distinction of little
significance in an empire known for ‘colonizing itself.’ Convinced of the region’s economic and
geo-political significance to Russia, Nevel’skoi made it his mission to not only render the land
myslenno Russian—redrawing maps to place the border further south—but to colonize it, making
it fakticheski Russian by establishing forts, naming landmarks, and raising Russian flags. After
accepting the assignment to Kamchatka, Nevel’skoi approached of the Naval Chief of Staff,
Prince Aleksandr Menshikov, for permission to explore the nearby Amur delta in search of a
navigable channel. His request was denied and a committee established to consider the question
further. Along with financial and practical concerns, Menshikov noted that Foreign Minister Karl
Nessel’rode was unlikely to approve a mission that could provoke the Chinese. 38 Only at a later
meeting did the committee agree that they must ‘prevent attempts by foreigners to occupy land
near the mouth of the Amur.’ They decided to send traders, rather than troops, to avoid conflict
with the Qing. 39 While they did not share the nationalist convictions of Nevel’skoi and the
Russian Geographical Society, they recognized the region’s significance in an era of imperialism
and respond with covert, yet deliberate, imperialism of their own.
Having departed from St. Petersburg in August of 1848, Nevel’skoi did not know about
the conversations that continued in St. Petersburg, nor of the committee’s plan to establish
dominance in the region through trade. Despite rejection of his proposal, the explorer refused to
be daunted in his quest to explore the Amur. In November he wrote to Murav’ev from Rio de
Janeiro that he would explore the river with or without permission, asking the Governor General
to appeal to the Tsar on his behalf. 40 It was not until February of 1849 that the committee granted
him permission to explore Sakhalin and the coastline north of the Amur River, although only by
rowboat and avoiding the river itself. 41 When weather delayed the arrival of the courier bearing
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his instructions, Nevel’skoi departed for the Amur unaware of the new directives from St.
Petersburg. 42
Nevel’skoi’s discoveries that summer would forever alter Russia’s position in the East.
He proved correct in assuming that previous explorers had been mistaken, as he watched whales
frolic in water shown on maps to be land. He found no river bisecting Sakhalin from the north, as
Kruzenshtern had suggested. 43 Even more significantly, he located a navigable channel along the
Amur’s southern bank, which he followed downstream, taking depth measurements along the
way. A week later he reached the Gulf of Tatary, confirming the navigability of the Amur River
delta. Nevel’skoi hoped that his disobedience would be forgiven. Not only was the Amur River
navigable, but no isthmus connected Sakhalin to the mainland, rendering the river approachable
from both north and south. 44 Murav’ev emphasized to Nessel’rode the importance to the state of
the ‘southern strait from the Liman and the unblocked entrance it provides for even the largest
ships from the Gulf of Tatary directly into the river!’ The Governor General continued, ‘This
discovery forces us to set about occupying the mouth of the Amur without delay, for we must
expect that it will be taken any day by others from the south,’ forcing the Russians to declare war
on the encroacher. 45 Inaction was no longer an option.
‘Sakhalin is an island’
Nevel’skoi is often lauded as the first to establish Sakhalin’s insularity, but that was not
important in 1849. 46 In his report to Menshikov, written soon after his return from the Liman to
the Russian-American Company station of Aian, Nevel’skoi emphasized not the insular status of
Sakhalin, but its suitability for Russian settlement. He wrote that he had charted the ‘entrance to
the Liman from the Gulf of Tatary’ and the channel up the Amur River. 47 He ended his
description: ‘Such are the Amur and its surroundings [as approached] from the sea.’ 48 Only in
later accounts did claims appear that he had proclaimed triumphantly to the Governor General
that ‘Sakhalin is an island!’ and emphasized the same to the Naval Chief of Staff. 49 Reports of
1849 mention no such announcements. 50 To both Nevel’skoi and the Russian state, what
mattered was not Sakhalin, but the Amur itself.
Although tsarist officials shared Nevel’skoi’s view of the Amur region as a natural
geographic unit, to the state, Nevel’skoi’s discovery rendered the area valuable, but not Russian.
To Nevel’skoi and Murav’ev, both of whom viewed water as integrating territory, rather than
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dividing it, the region’s Russianness seemed obvious. The Amur River flowed from Siberia and
had been home to Russian Cossacks in the seventeenth century. Employing both nationalist and
imperialist rhetoric, they argued that a Russian presence was again necessary at the Amur’s
mouth, as the channel rendered the river vulnerable, endangering Siberia as a whole. Yet the
region was not merely strategic to Russia, but was rightfully Russian, according to their
arguments. Even Sakhalin belonged rightfully to Russia, Murav’ev emphasized to Menshikov,
not only because of they had—he claimed—first discovered it, but because it was located next to
the Russian-owned Kuril archipelago, its southern tip at the same latitude as the Russian island
of Urup. 51
The differing positions of liberals and conservatives became clear in the debates that
followed. While liberal-leaning Menshikov was persuaded by the arguments of Nevel’skoi and
Murav’ev, the conservative Foreign Minister was not. Although Nevel’skoi found no evidence of
Chinese in the region, Nessel’rode maintained that his map was accurate. He resented
Nevel’skoi’s insubordination and demanded that the officer be reprimanded. Murav’ev,
meanwhile, contacted the Tsar directly with his concerns. In an 18 March [1850] memo to
Nicholas I, he pointed out the threat Britain posed to the Amur Region, given the growing British
influence in China. He proposed a compromise: inform the Chinese that the Russians would act
in the interests of both empires by protecting the Amur from foreign—meaning British—
encroachment. 52 Nessel’rode remained unmoved. Only after long debates did the committee
resolve to cautiously expand Russian influence in the region. Nevel’skoi was to establish a single
post to the north of the Amur, but not approach the river itself. To avoid the appearance of
encroachment on China, the post would be a wintering station for the Russian-American
Company. Nevel’skoi would serve directly under Murav’ev. The delicate question of the river
was set aside, and Sakhalin was left out of the discussion altogether. 53
‘Where once a Russian flag has been raised…’
To Nevel’skoi, to whom the land was already myslenno Russian, the next step was occupation,
rendering it fakticheski Russian—to use his later terminology—demonstrated by a flag and a
military post. Despite the caution urged by the committee, Nevel’skoi grew more confident once
he answered to Murav’ev. In accordance with instructions, upon his return in 1850, he founded
Petrovskoe Wintering Station to the north of the Liman to serve as headquarters for the Russian-
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American Company. Disregarding the committee’s admonition, he made plans to explore the
river and establish a post at its mouth. He told a fellow officer, ‘If the General’s [Murav’ev’s]
permission does not arrive in time, we will take command ourselves in the name of God.’ 54
Without waiting for the General’s permission, he departed for the Amur, where he encountered
the Manchu traders and unhappy Nivkhs described above. Three weeks later, he established
Nikolaevskii Post at the river’s mouth, raising a Russian military flag to the accompaniment of
cannon shots and the Russian national hymn. 55 While Nevel’skoi’s later account portrays his
declaration as spontaneous, he had been planning such actions from the start. Upon his return, he
evoked nationalist sentiments to justify his disobedience, explaining that he had acted out of
‘moral responsibility to the fatherland,’ fearing loss of the region to Russia forever. 56
This act of disobedience challenged the mental maps of the Tsar’s ministers, with not
one, but now two Russian outposts—Nikolaevskii and Petrovskoe—on what was ostensibly
Chinese land. Murav’ev defended Nevel’skoi to the Tsar, but the committee was concerned.
Based on intelligence from Peking about supposed troop movement in the region, some
committee members felt the new post should be withdrawn. Others argued that Nevel’skoi
should be demoted. Nevel’skoi was scolded: ‘What if every captain first class disregards the
tsar’s orders for the good of the fatherland?’ 57 Tsar Nicholas, however, was reportedly pleased
with Nevel’skoi’s initiative, calling it ‘valiant, noble, and patriotic,’ and declaring ‘where once a
Russian flag has been raised, never shall it be lowered.’ 58 When the Tsar reconvened the
committee in January 1851, the conservative Nessel’rode was replaced by the more liberal
tsarevich, the future Alexander II. In February they reached a decision. Nikolaevskii Post was to
be maintained as an outpost of the Russian-American Company. Sixty men from the Siberian
fleet would be assigned to Nevel’skoi for a so-called ‘Amur Expedition.’ 59 Because of continued
concern about China, the Russian-American Company must appear to be working alone.
Nevel’skoi was to make no further proclamations. 60
THE AMUR EXPEDITION
Upon his return to the Far East in the summer of 1851, in charge of a covert but now authorized
‘Amur Expedition,’ Nevel’skoi strove to achieve his own goals as well as official interests of the
state. As a representative of the Russian-American Company, he sent out officers and Company
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agents to develop trade and build relations with local peoples. That winter he dispatched four
explorers—one to the north, two to the south, and one eastward to Sakhalin. 61 Based on their
reports, he identified seven strategic locations for Russian posts in the region, six on the
mainland and one across the strait. 62 While he had already declared the land Russian, to establish
it as Russian fakticheski, the next summer (1852) he disregarded orders and placed men, guns,
and flags in four of those strategic points.
While Nevel’skoi continued to view Sakhalin and the mainland Amur basin as a unit,
Sakhalin itself drew the officer’s attention in late 1851 when four Nivkhs visited Petrovskoe, one
wearing a button of Sakhalin coal. Nevel’skoi realized that if coal were present on the island, the
land would be valuable not merely for the Amur’s defense, but as a source of fuel for Pacific
steamships. The Nivkhs also reported that five Russians had lived on Sakhalin for many years,
and that one had only recently died. If true, Nevel’skoi reasoned, Russians were not only the first
to discover the island (in the seventeenth century), but the first civilized people to settle there. In
February of 1852, as similar expeditions were underway throughout the Amur region, Nevel’skoi
sent Lieutenant Nikolai Boshniak by dogsled over the frozen Tatar Strait. He was instructed to
search for coal beds, gather population data, and inquire about ships that had approached the
island’s shores and any Russians who had resided there. 63 In accordance with instructions,
Nevel’skoi told Boshniak not to announce Russian possession of the island or to promise
protection, but instead to initiate trade, as would be expected of a Russian-American Company
agent. 64
Boshniak’s travels convinced Nevel’skoi that the island warranted further attention, but
failed to establish a historical Russian presence on the island. The explorer found coal, but no
natural harbor, remarking tongue-in-cheek that ‘nature, having so generously scattered coal…
evidently wished to balance the ease of gathering it with the difficulty of its transport.’ He
verified only that shipwrecked Russian sailors had lived on the island for approximately two
decades. 65 While the official Russian map depicted southern Sakhalin as belonging to Japan,
Boshniak reported that the Sakhalin natives he met were subject to neither Qing nor Japanese
rule. Foreign ships indeed raided their villages each spring. 66 He was told that there were Ainus
in southern Sakhalin, but met few Nivkhs who had ever encountered them. Even fewer had
encountered any Japanese. 67 Inland he found Uil’tas, reindeer-herders whom he believed were
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related to the East Siberian Evenks (Tungus) who paid tribute to Russian Cossacks. 68 Yet the
Uil’ta avoided Boshniak, reportedly out of fear that he would subject them to Russian rule. 69
Despite Boshniak’s failure to demonstrate that Sakhalin was historically Russian—and despite
strict instructions not to proclaim the region so—once the ice melted, Nevel’skoi dispatched
Second Lieutenant Aleksei Voronin to explore Sakhalin by boat and to inform residents that
Sakhalin was a Russian possession. If he encountered foreign ships, he was to raise the Russian
flag and declare that both Sakhalin and the mainland belonged to Russia. 70
THE SAKHALIN EXPEDITION
In the end, it was not the Amur Expedition that convinced the state to claim Sakhalin and the
mainland Amur basin, rewriting maps and sending troops to protect Russia’s distant land. Not
belief in the Russian nation, but fear of Western imperialism persuaded the state to act. While
two small posts had sufficed to protect villagers from marauding whalers, when word reached
Murav’ev of a large American naval expedition heading toward the region, he was concerned.
Directing his attention to the Tatar Strait, Murav’ev wrote to Nevel’skoi in May of 1852, ‘It is
vital that the Americans see Russians in DeKastri harbor [on the mainland shore across from
Sakhalin] and on Sakhalin, and that we make clear to them that we are here and no one else can
be…. It will be necessary to watch for the Americans and show them as many men as possible
on Sakhalin and the Tatar Strait.’ 71 Meanwhile, tensions in Europe were mounting and would
soon lead to the Crimean War.
That winter (early 1853), Murav’ev presented Tsar Nicholas with an eloquent plea for
Russian attention to the Amur region, citing not only geopolitical interests, but invoking Russia’s
manifest destiny to stretch to the ocean. It was not to be regretted that the Russian-American
Company left California, Murav’ev told the Tsar. It was the destiny of the United States to
possess all of North America, just as Russia, too, must extend to the Pacific. As the Far East
gained strategic significance due to Commodore Matthew Perry’s approach and growing
tensions in Europe, Murav’ev argued that ‘because of its longstanding possession of the shores
of the Pacific Ocean,’ Russia had more right to both Sakhalin and the mainland Amur region
than any other power. Murav’ev continued, referring to British influence in China, ‘We have
[already] allowed the English to intrude into this part of Asia…. To the detriment and reproach
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of all of Europe, that little island has inflicted its laws over all the earth.’ It was Russia’s duty, he
concluded, to intervene. The Russian-American Company must establish operations on Sakhalin
Island immediately. 72 To Murav’ev’s surprise, the Tsar agreed.
Within a year, what began as an admonition to ‘show [Perry’s troops] as many men as
possible’ on both sides of the strait became a Russian ‘occupation’ of Sakhalin itself. 73 No longer
was the island merely part of the Amur region—the eastern shore of the Tatar Strait and a natural
extension of Siberia. With its proximity to Japan and the approaching American squadron, St.
Petersburg officials felt it merited troops of its own to protect the strait and the entrance to the
Amur. Grand Duke Constantine, head of the Russian Navy, approached the Russian-American
Company with the task. With decades of experience in Russian America, the Company was wellsuited to defend Sakhalin from Russia’s enemies.
To the Russian state, Sakhalin became a colony, while the mainland Amur basin was
integrated into Russia itself. Unlike the covert Company expeditions on the mainland, Sakhalin,
it seemed, merited a fort providing full military protection, as provided in Alaska. Company
officials proposed occupation of two points on the southern shores in view of approaching enemy
ships. They promised to construct redoubts modeled after their North American forts, and to send
a governor from Alaska. Meanwhile, Nevel’skoi was to land one hundred troops on the island—a
military operation referred to as the ‘Sakhalin Expedition.’ 74 If they encountered Japanese
resistance, Nevel’skoi was to explain that they had come to protect the island from American
attack. 75 If necessary, they were to be prepared to fight.
The territory across the strait, meanwhile, became more than simply part of an expansive
Russian empire, but was integrated into Russia itself. That same month (April 1853), Murav’ev
presented the Tsar with evidence from a recent expedition by Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Agte
[Akhte] that the Qing had neither forts nor settlers along the Amur. After considering
Murav’ev’s arguments and examining Agte’s maps and reports, the Tsar reportedly exclaimed
‘So it’s ours!’ [itak eto nashe!], and ordered the Minister of War to approach China on the
subject. 76 No longer needing the Russian-American Company as a smokescreen, the Tsar
ordered Company affiliation on the mainland to end. This was not a colony, but long-time
Russian land. Expedition members were to receive government salaries and pensions. Because of
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the American threat, troops were scheduled to arrive the next year, along with medical personnel,
clerks and a priest. 77 Balasoglo’s ‘holy place’ would be empty no more.
The Amur divided
Paradoxically, once both sides of the strait had been declared Russian, the Amur basin became
divided, no longer a single territory united by waterways, but separate regions with their own
administrations, histories, and diplomatic concerns. Most obvious was the administrative
division. Sakhalin occupation was separated from the covert Amur Expedition of Nevel’skoi,
who served under the Governor General, and given to the Russian-American Company, with its
governor from Alaska who would answer directly to St. Petersburg. The Company was released
from service on the mainland. Now that the state claimed the territory officially, it no longer
needed the pretense of trading missions to explore, nor a Company wintering station in place of a
military post. The integration of the mainland Amur basin into East Siberia had begun.
The state’s exclusion of Sakhalin from the Amur region is evident also in the manner in
which the regions were claimed. The mainland Amur became Russian through placement at
strategic locations of traders and soldiers, who met little resistance from the indigenous
population. When Nevel’skoi proclaimed that the land was Russian in 1851, the Tsar supported
his declaration. When he received maps showing no Chinese in the region, the Tsar agreed that
the land had been Russian all along. Yet Sakhalin was not treated as part of Russia. The Sakhalin
Expedition was a military invasion complete with cannons and a well-defended fort. Sakhalin
was treated as foreign, a colony occupied for geopolitical purposes, while the mainland was
Russian by right. One hundred men were assigned to the Sakhalin Expedition, more than had
been allotted to the Amur Expedition over the past two years.
The separation between Sakhalin and the mainland Amur was expressed diplomatically
as well. Once the Tsar acknowledged the mainland as Russian, he sent envoys to China to settle
the issue at an international level. No such measures were taken regarding Sakhalin. Although
islanders had historically paid tribute to the Qing, Foreign Minister Nessel’rode did not seek
Chinese consent for Russian occupation. Nor did he approach Japan on the subject, despite the
appearance of southern Sakhalin as Japanese on the official Russian map. Instead he approved of
the occupation on the grounds that ‘our government is not bound by treaties regarding Sakhalin
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with either Japan or China.’ 78 To St. Petersburg, Sakhalin was no man’s land, not Russian, but
free for the taking. In an era of imperialism, it needed to be taken quickly.
Sakhalin’s disassociation from the mainland Amur signified a departure from the position
of Nevel’skoi, to whom the island remained part of a greater Amur basin that had long belonged
to Russia. Even after the island had been given to the Russian-American Company, Nevel’skoi
explained to Japanese fishermen he encountered that, ‘On the basis of [the Treaty of Nerchinsk],
Sakhalin Island, as a continuation of the lower Amur basin, is a Russian possession.’ (emphasis
mine) While the mainland was more valuable than the island, it made no sense to him to divide
them, and he did not share the state’s view of Sakhalin as foreign. To him both sides of the strait
merited protection, and it was unwise to devote troops first to the island, rather than the mainland
shores of the Amur region. He expressed his dissatisfaction in his memoirs, explaining that ‘the
state, once it recognized that Sakhalin belonged to Russia, turned all of its attention toward it.
The shores of the Tatar Strait with its harbors that make the area so important to Russia were left
without any attention at all.’ 79
Murav’evskii Post
The occupation itself got off to a promising start. In September 1853, the Company transport
vessel Nikolai anchored off Sakhalin’s southern shore, and three boats flying Russian flags
transported thirty armed troops to the island. Having strategically arrived near a Japanese fishing
village, Nevel’skoi announced to the onlookers: ‘We stand here on this island for the protection
of land and people, desiring to live in peace with the Japanese and all residents of the island, in
no way to hinder industry or trade.’ The troops stood at attention to sing the ‘Our Father’ and
‘God Save the Tsar,’ and Lieutenant Nikolai Busse, appointed commander of the newly founded
post, raised the Russian flag in the sand. Japanese and Ainu elders assisted in the installation of
the flag, a gesture Nevel’skoi interpreted as an expression of support. 80 While the troops
assembled a battery of eight twelve-pounder carronades, Nevel’skoi invited the Japanese elders
to the ship to celebrate. 81 Meanwhile, Russian sailors negotiated the purchase of barns to
accommodate men and supplies, while Ainus unloaded the ship with their wide, flat-bottomed
boats. Nevel’skoi reported to the Governor General, ‘And thus, to the glory of God in the
Highest, concluded the occupation of the main point on the island which controls all of
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Sakhalin!’ 82 Lieutenant Boshniak recalled in 1859, ‘It seemed that nothing could have gone
better.’ 83
Russian confidence was soon shattered, as local residents disregarded Nevel’skoi’s
declaration. If on the mainland, Nevel’skoi’s men maintained friendly relations with the
indigenous peoples, on southern Sakhalin neither Japanese nor Ainus submitted to the selfproclaimed authorities. The next day the Russians found the Japanese settlement deserted, and
Busse heard rumors that they were plotting an attack. 84 Even more complicated was the position
of the Ainus, indigenous Sakhalin inhabitants whom the Russians promised to free from
Japanese oppression. Nevel’skoi reported that Ainu elders told him that ‘this was [Ainu] land,
and that everything we saw on the shore had been made by them,’ while others ‘explained that
the Japanese beat them with sticks and gave them nothing in return.’ 85 Busse believed the Ainus
were happy about the Russians’ arrival. 86 But most Ainus remained devoted to their Japanese
masters. Company officials were perplexed by their unwillingness to trade. 87 Some Ainus
manipulated the situation, realizing that complaints about the Japanese brought favor with the
Russians. The Russians never knew whom to trust. 88
Nevel’skoi did not abandon his claim that Sakhalin was rightfully and historically
Russian. He emphasized in his reports that one expedition member did encounter Sakhalin
islanders with tie to Russia. While traveling northward, Company agent D.I. Samarin came
across villages in which inhabitants, he believed, were descendants of Russians and Evenks who
had intermarried centuries earlier. To Nevel’skoi, this indicated Russians had settled the island
long before the Japanese. Samarin reported that the natives of one village had dark blond or
brown hair rather than black and kept their yurts tidy and comfortable. These interactions
featured prominently in Nevel’skoi’s memoir, in which he maintained that they ‘demonstrated
once and for all Russia’s indisputable right to possess…Sakhalin Island.’ 89
NATION AND EMPIRE
With the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, Sakhalin and the mainland Amur basin were
separated conclusively in the minds of Russian statesmen, and soon to the public as a whole. As
European powers were competing in Crimea over Ottoman territory, Nevel’skoi’s romantic
notions of a united Russian Amur were overshadowed by the urgency of imperialism. As the war
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moved eastward, the post was withdrawn in Spring 1854, before the new governor had even
arrived. Nevel’skoi claimed to have warned Busse about the impending hostilities, instructing
him not to abandon the island, but there is no evidence that Busse received such a letter. 90 When
Britain and France declared war on Russia that March, Russian Vice-Admiral Evfimii Putiatin
relocated his squadron from Nagasaki—where he was conducting trade negotiations—to the
Strait of Tatary for protection. He speculated that it may be safest for the post to be withdrawn. 91
Busse agreed, and on May 31, the troops departed. 92
In the end, neither Russia’s alleged ‘indisputable right’ 93 to the land nor the strategicallyplaced post made Sakhalin Russian either myslenno or fakticheski. Instead, the Treaty of
Shimoda, signed by Putiatin in February of 1855, declared Sakhalin ambiguously ‘unpartitioned
between Russia and Japan, as has been the case up to this time.’ 94 What that meant was never
clarified. Concerned primarily with establishing trade relations with the Japanese, Putiatin
implied that Russia was would be willing to divide the island, and underscored the withdrawal of
the post as an indication of Russian goodwill. 95 While the claim of historical joint possession
was fictitious, it allowed both sides to subordinate territorial disputes to more pressing economic
and political concerns.
An event later that spring reinforced the mental separation of Sakhalin from the nowRussian mainland, drawing attention to the region in the popular press. Once the realm of
classified documents known to a small number of the Tsar’s advisors, Sakhalin gained
international recognition as the Crimean War moved into the Pacific. In May of 1855, Russia’s
Pacific fleet sought refuge in the DeKastri Harbor across from Sakhalin in the Tatar Strait.
Unaware of the channel continuing upriver, the British did not pursue them, assuming the
Russians to be trapped. One foggy night, the Russian ships slipped quietly through the strait into
the Liman. In the morning, they were simply gone. 96
Celebrated in Russia and lamented in Britain, the incident drew worldwide attention to
region, emphasizing Sakhalin’s insularity and forcing the redrawing of European maps. 97 The
escape reinforced the position that Sakhalin and the mainland Amur region were not a unified
whole, but were separated by a channel through which the entire fleet could escape. While
Russians officially included the joint Japanese-Russian Sakhalin as part of the Maritime
[Primorskaia] oblast established in 1856, it was missing from the mental maps of Russian
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statesmen as well as the educated public. Despite its strategic location, for the next decade, the
island received little attention from the state. 98
CONCLUSIONS
Sakhalin became Russian once again in 1875, when the Treaty of St. Petersburg placed the
Russo-Japanese border between Sakhalin and Ezo (Hokkaido). Yet it did not become russkii—
part of the Russian nation. Even within Russia, there was little agreement regarding Russia’s
‘true’ borders in the East. Russia’s appropriation of the mainland Amur basin in 1853—
reinforced in 1858 by the Treaty of Aigun and confirmed by the 1860 Treaty of St. Petersburg—
did not reflect the views predominant among the Tsar’s ministers of the 1840s. It took place
despite them, due in part to an obstinate explorer who ignored orders from above. The official
Sakhalin Expedition—a military occupation that shared more in common with Russian America
than Siberia—resulted in the detachment of the island from the mainland, rendering it seemingly
separate from Russia and other. Sakhalin gained increasing attention in the press in the 1870s,
but the image created was of a distant colony, remote and dangerous, although rich in resources.
When the Russian state and society turned its attention toward the mainland Amur region in the
late 1850s, Sakhalin was seldom included.
Following the myslennaia geography of today, in which land, rather than water, creates
natural units of territory, the history of Sakhalin is often written separately from that of the
Amur. Yet to explorers in the mid-nineteenth century, the Strait was not a border separating two
distinct landmasses, but a highway upon which Russians could move and settle. To Nevel’skoi, it
seemed a natural unit that merited a common administration. Nor did the 1849 confirmation of
Sakhalin’s insularity render the island non-Russian. As Bruce Batten notes, even for islands,
‘there is no such thing as a “natural” boundary, either in Japan or elsewhere.’ 99 Not until 1853
was the island separated administratively from the mainland. When Murav’evskii Post was
withdrawn, the island did not rejoin East Siberia, but became even less Russian, as it was shared
with Japan. Despite the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg, the island’s foreignness was reinforced
once again following the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, when Tsar Nicholas II insisted that ‘not
an inch of primordial Russian land’ be surrendered. He agreed, however, to yield the southern
half of Sakhalin Island, calling it ‘land that we stole [nagrabili] in better times.’ 100
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In the modern era, borders are markers of identity, often national identity, reinforcing
myths of a united people and a unified land. 101 The Russian border is often assumed to
correspond naturally with the ocean itself. Yet that was not always the case. As Tessa MorrisSuzuki notes, ‘Borders are created in the mind when nations appropriate territory by mapping,
naming or renaming frontier regions.’ 102 Only through a decade of mapping, naming, and
renaming within the remote Amur River basin did a lasting border become established. Its
strength is evident as it survived even the end of the Soviet Union, when other colonies
demanded independence as separate states.
While Sakhalin became—and remains—Russian territory, unlike the mainland Amur
region, it became separated from Russia on maps and in Russian imaginations. This was not a
natural process in which a narrow strait created a boundary between island and continent. It was
the result of strategy and negotiation in which multiple parties had stakes. It was not the position
of Nevel’skoi that the area be divided, but a decision made in St. Petersburg by men who had
never been to the region, a central state exerting its authority to the ends of its empire. Even
today, while airplanes render Sakhalin temporally closer to Moscow than much of European
Russia, Sakhaliners frequently refer to Russia as someplace else, far away and different from
their homeland. Despite efforts to resignify Sakhalin, the response of Chekhov’s coachman
continues to resonate. ‘It is dull here, Your Honor,’ the coachman allegedly maintained in 1890,
expressing a sentiment common among Europeans living in distant colonies. Emphasizing that
‘here’—referring to Sakhalin—was different from Russia, he continued, ‘In Russia [in our
Russia, u nas v Rossii] it is better.’ 103
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